Price-Cost Margins and Profit Rates in New Zealand Electricity Distribution Networks Since 1994: the Cost of Light Handed Regulation

From 1994 to 2003, New Zealands corporatized electricity lines networks operated with no industry regulator, but under the spotlight of mandatory information disclosure. As a result there exists a large body of detailed, audited and publicly available accounting data on the financial performance of these businesses. Using that data, this paper finds that price-cost margins have widened substantially since deregulation. We estimate the extent to which light-handed regulation has allowed profits to exceed the levels which would have been acceptable under the old rate-of-return regulatory framework, and find that the answer is about $200 million per year, on an ongoing basis.We thank colleagues at Victoria University, and two anonymous referees for this journal, for constructive comments on this paper. Any remaining errors are entirely our responsibility.JEL classification: D21; K23; L11; L43; L51     

Banks’ non-traditional activities under regulatory changes: impact on risk,performance and capital adequacy

Using the big six Canadian chartered banks quarterly financial statements and daily stock market data from 1982 to 2018, we examine the impact of non-interest income on Canadian banks’ risk, performance and capital under the different major regulatory changes made to the Bank Act of Canada. Our results show that Canadian banks’ expansion into non-traditional activities had slightly decreased their risks and significantly improved their performance benefitting from income diversification. Moreover, while adhering to capital adequacy regulation, reshuffling banks’ portfolio towards non-traditional activities did not reduce Canadian banks’ capital ratio. In spite of the re-regulation towards universal banking against ring-fencing, this feature buttresses the effectiveness of capital adequacy regulation in Canada in linking banks capital allocation with their risk taking.     

论利率管制与货币供给量中介目标之间的矛盾

本文从货币当局无力同时控制利率和货币供给量的角度出发,探讨了利率管制与货币供给量中介目标之间的矛盾;分析了利率管制条件下,以货币供给量为货币政策中介目标,货币政策效果不佳,即实际货币供给量偏离中介目标货币供给量以及实际收入水平偏离最终目标收入水平的深层原因;指出了近年来我国货币供给量中介目标效果不佳,从根本上来说,是由我国客观存在的利率管制和货币供给量中介目标之间的矛盾造成的,是这种矛盾的必然结果.     

Strategic Firm Behavior Under Average-Revenue-Lagged Regulation

Price caps have been shown to have incentive properties superior to traditional rate of return regulation. Average-revenue-lagged regulation (ARL) is attractive in that steady-state prices are known to be efficient. We show that the ARL scheme can be manipulated by the firm so as to yield the unregulated global profit maximum. While tests exist that can provide the regulator with evidence of this strategic behavior, we also demonstrate that the unregulated global profit maximum will not be attainable if Laspeyres (L) regulation is employed.Jel classification: L43, L51I would like to thank Michael Crew and an anonymous referee for their extremely helpful suggestions.     

中国农业土地经营的规模研究--小块农地经营的案例分析

本文采用施蒂格勒的生存检验法,研究了我国农业土地经营规模问题。从理论上和经验上得出如下结论:土地经营并没有确切的最优规模界限和最优生产模式,在不同的约束条件下,行为当事人将选择交易费用最低的经济组织形式。中国农民在可兼业的条件下,小规模的个体农户的经营方式是符合规模经济要求的。通过对我国农村要素市场的研究,验证了克莱因、克劳福德和阿尔钦假说,在农村劳动力价格上升和农用机械可以拆分、进行跨区作业的条件下,大的机械化农场就不是规模经济的必然要求,而强调走单纯的大机械化农场的农业发展道路的主张是错误的。     

我国房地产宏观调控政策效应实证分析

近年来,我国房地产市场虽日趋成熟,但房价波动仍然较大,为此政府对房地产行业进行了多次宏观调控。本文采用中国房地产指数通过GARCH类模型对北京、上海两大城市的住宅和商铺数据进行回归分析,通过分析得出以下结论。其一,政府对房地产的调控政策对各个市场的影响不同,且住宅市场受到的影响要大于商铺市场。其二,政府实施的鼓励或调控的政策对各地房地产市场造成的冲击效用也不相同,以首轮调控“国八条”的冲击是最大的。     

论市场经济中自然垄断产业的价格管制——基于政府目标函数的分析

鉴于垄断产生的基础是差异,而自然垄断者在超过成本递增的范围之后,仍然可以通过品牌或者成本优势以及其他因素,继续对市场实施一定的控制,所以自然垄断者的垄断地位具有内在持续性.在对自然垄断进行价格管制的过程中,政府的目标函数在不同的时点上是存在着差别的,进而会影响价格管制工具的选择.在自然垄断领域放松管制的趋势下,价格管制也日益宽松.     

现代市场经济调节的"第三只手"

通常,我们把市场调节比喻为“看不见的手”,把宏观调控比喻为“看得见的手”。同时,可以把文化道德调节作为现代市场经济调节的“第三只手”。有了这三只手,现代市场经济才会健康协调地向前发展。     

岷江上游退耕还林的思考

岷江上游不仅是长江上游生态屏障障的重要组成部分，更是成都平原的重要生态屏障和水源生命线，该区拥有丰富的水、生物、旅游等可再生资源，但在退耕还林（草）生态建设中表现出退耕面积扩大化、国家补贴政策一刀切、经济林比重过大等问题。文章指出，应在克服上述问题基础上，通过调整农村产业内部结构、加大坡耕地改造、发展旅游业、水电业以及加强变通、通讯设施建设是实现经济可持续发展的最佳选择。     

环境管制收益和成本的评估与分配

环境质量标准设定得是否合适,关键在于能否对环境管制的收益和成本做出准确的评估。在过去三十多年里,环境经济学得到了快速的发展,环境经济学家设计了新的方法,并做了大量的实证研究,来测度实际的或被提议的环境管制的收益和成本。然而,评估管制成本本身并不是一项简单的任务,环境经济学家将主要关注放在了总账的收益一边。关注的中心是,评估非市场物品收益的方法论的发展。这些方法可归纳为间接市场法和直接调查法两大类。本文对这两种方法,以及它们在评估环境管制收益和成本方面的应用,进行了评述。